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Abstract
A distinctive feature of recent revolutions was the key role of social
media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). We study the role of social
media in mobilization. In a simple model we assume that while social me-
dia allow to observe all previous decisions, mass media only give aggregate
information about the state of a revolt. We show that when individuals
willingness to revolt is publicly known, then both sorts of media foster
a successful revolution. However, when willingness to revolt is private
information, only social media ensure that a revolt succeeds, with mass
media multiple outcomes are possible. This suggests that social media
enhance the likelihood that a revolution triumphs more than traditional
mass media.
Keywords: social media, mass media, revolution, coordination game,
sequential games
JEL Classication: C72, D02, D74
1. Introduction
"We use Facebook to schedule protests, Twitter to coordinate, and You-
Tube to tell the world." (Anonymous Cairo Activist)
In recent years there were many demonstrations that attracted considerable
public attention internationally. The mass protests that started the uprisings
against the regimes in the Arab world, the demonstrations of the indignados
movement in Spain or the Occupy movement worldwide are the most promin-
ent examples. A distinguishing feature of these events was the omnipresence
of social media (especially, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube). Many scholars
Eötvös Loránd University - Department of Economics; Research fellow in the Mo-
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wonder how these new information technologies a¤ect social movements. Do
they help to overthrow autocratic regimes more easily or do they help promote
social issues more than the former technology? (e.g. [3]).
Social media a¤ect the evolution of protests in various ways. Social media
help to inform audiences around the world about the unfolding of the events,
attracting international attention and provoking diplomatic pressure. These new
technologies also o¤er an easy, quick and inexpensive means of communication
that helps to spread information among the participants. However, it should also
be noted that social media are also used by the repressive regimes. Autocratic
regimes control the Internet to a large extent. For instance, during the Arab
spring several times the governments just shut Internet down for days, they
actively monitor chats and forums and also develop fake websites to attract and
identify potential opponents (see chapter 4 in [4]).
In this paper we focus on the role of social media in mobilizing the masses
in an autocratic regime. That is, we concentrate on how these new technologies
may help that successful massive protests are organized in countries where this
kind of demonstrations were rare before. We argue that a potential channel
for the success of these protests is that social media provide such a detailed
structure of information that makes that the coordination game that the dis-
contented citizens play has a unique equilibrium. Mass media (e.g. TV, radio)
- even if not manipulated by the regime - lead to multiple equilibria in our main
setup. Our approach is game-theoretical, we use standard equilibrium concepts
to obtain the results. Our contribution to the existing literature is that we show
rigorously that there is a qualitative di¤erence between mass and social media
in mobilization, the latter being able to promote mobilization more e¢ ciently.
E¢ cient mobilization is a key factor to achieve the goals of any movement.
Mobilization relies on the channels of communication and the ow of inform-
ation that enable dissidents to organize themselves and engage in collective
action. Hence, communication and the technologies that make it possible play
a crucial role in mobilization. We present a model that explains how mass and
social media a¤ect mobilization when it is known that there are enough willing
individuals to overthrow the dictator. Our starting point is that willingness to
participate in the protests depends on the perceived costs and benets of par-
ticipation. Arguably, heading out onto the streets implies the costs of facing
tear gas, rubber bullets and potential arrest and incarceration. Benets involve
the perceived gains in participating in an uprising that may bring about a bet-
ter future, provided it succeeds. The probability of success is highly related to
the number of participants. Yet, when a potential protester decides whether to
participate, possibly she has only a vague idea about if su¢ cient other people
will participate. Di¤erent types of media may a¤ect these expectations (and
the resulting mobilization) in diverse ways.
We posit that when an individual obtains information through mass media
then she gets to know the actual state of the revolution in that moment, whereas
when informed via social media she is able to observe the sequence of decisions
leading up to that state. For instance, when a search in Twitter is realized, the
individual gets the last conversations about the topic, and by scrolling down the
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page she is able to see all previous tweets about it. In Facebook, the users may
comment on the events and all previous comments can be read. We suppose
that tweets and comments are informative about the individualsdecision to join
the protests or to stay at home. By contrast, when TV or radio inform about
the state of a given event, the precise history remains hidden, only aggregate
information about the turnout is reported.
We model the problem of revolution as a coordination problem. We suppose
that there are two groups in the society: one consists of individuals who want to
overthrow the dictator (willing individuals) and the another one is composed of
individuals who do not want to change the regime (unwilling individuals). We
assume that there are enough willing individuals to bring about a change. That
is, if all of them revolt, then the dictator is overthrown. However, if the number
of protesters (those willing individuals who actually head onto the streets) falls
short of a critical mass, then the dictator remains in power and may punish
those who participated in the failed revolt. We assume that individuals choose
consecutively if they want to take part in the revolt or not, and the order of de-
cisions is randomly selected. Before decision, each individual is informed about
the state of the revolution. When this information is channeled through mass
media, the individual learns how many people have already chosen to participate
(i.e. the actual state of the revolution). The di¤erence when informed through
the social media is that individuals observe each of the past decisions (e.g. the
precise history).
First, we show that when the type of individuals (that is, if she is willing to
revolt or not) is public information and they are informed through any of the
communication technologies, each willing individual takes part in the revolution
and, thus, it is successful. However, it is not necessarily the case when the
individuals receive no information about the state of the revolution. This result
indicates that the mere existence of communication technologies (that are not
manipulated) enabling to spread information facilitates that social movements
achieve their objective. Without the communication technologies individuals
play a simultaneous game that has multiple equilibria.
Second, we study a more realistic setup in which the type of individuals is not
observed (i.e. it is private information). We assume that individuals know that
there are enough individuals to change the regime, but they do not know who the
willing individuals are. Under these circumstances, the type of communication
technology becomes relevant. We prove that mass media do not necessarily
enable willing individuals to organize themselves e¢ ciently. Thus, depending on
the perceived costs and benets willing individuals possibly choose not to revolt.
However, successful revolution is the unique equilibrium outcome when willing
individuals use social media, independently of the severity of punishment that
protesters may su¤er if they fail to overthrow the dictator. This result shows
that communication through social media facilitates that revolutions succeed
more than when communication is channeled through traditional mass media.
Although our comparison of mass and social media suggests that they are
competing communication technologies, our results can be interpreted as an-
swering the question about how social media enhance mass medias ability to
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mobilize individuals. In this respect, our ndings shed light on the di¤erential
e¤ect that social media have compared to the traditional mass media.
Section 2 reviews briey the relevant literature. Section 3 presents the model
and the results. In Section 4 we discuss two examples and Section 5 concludes.
All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Literature Review
Our interpretation of the process why an individual joins a protests follows the
rationalist view that the citizens assess the costs and benets of participating
in a revolt (see, for instance, [7] and the references therein). A key issue in
the rational school is why citizens join revolutions. Social networks play an im-
portant role at several stages of the process. [14] distinguishes three functions
of social networks: socialization, structural-connection function and decision-
shaping function. Social media create social networks that are important in
community creation, in connecting the prospective participants and also in the
decision-making, since individuals use the information coming from the social
network to anticipate and evaluate the potential costs and outcome of parti-
cipation. Most importantly, the decision to join the revolution depends on the
intentions and action of other participants. If many other citizens are expected
to join, then the revolution is likely to succeed and this makes participation
more attractive. In the opposite case, staying at home may be the optimal
decision. Hence, the decision is strategical, because it depends on the beha-
vior of others. Both mass and social media enable individuals to form beliefs
about the turnout at the protest, but they di¤er in the degree of how detailed
the information is. We show that social media promote better mobilization,
because from an individuals point of view they give more accurate information
about previous decisions and they allow that subsequent individuals observe the
decision.
[1] studies the role of vanguards that shifts the equilibrium from no revolution
into one in which citizens revolt. The vanguard uses violence and it is inform-
ative about the discontent in the society and individuals sensing the increased
dissatisfaction are more likely to join the revolution. We do not consider van-
guards, the observability of actions determines whether the individuals desiring
a regime change coordinate successfully or not. In this sense, [2] is the paper
that is closest to ours in spirit. Chwe analyzes the minimal conditions that make
coordination feasible among willing individuals, regardless of the prior beliefs
about the willingness of the others. To do so, he considers only the state of the
world in which everybody is willing. As a consequence, when somebody stays
at home, then it is known that it was a willing individual. In our model, both
types are present and the main di¢ culty comes from what a willing individual
believes when observing that somebody stays at home. We argue that social
media allow to infer the type of the individual that stayed at home and this
helps to avoid coordination failure, whereas mass media fails to do so. The
logic behind the inference is easy: if given a history of past decisions a willing
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individuals optimal decision was to join the protest, but the citizen stayed at
home, then it must be an unwilling citizen.
The aim of this paper is to show that di¤erences between the information
transmitted by mass and social media make that the latter makes the revolution
triumph. This seems to suggest that social media is a catalyst for a regime
change. However, the empirical evidence is not unambigous. For instance, while
the demonstrations organized through Facebook were extremely successful in
Egypt in January 2011, in 2008 the April 6 Youth Movement failed to trigger
mass protests in the same country. In 2011, in Syria the "days of rage" protest
was endorsed by 12000 individuals online, but nothing happened. It shows
that a problem of commitment (supporting an event on Facebook, but not
attending it) may arise in the Internet.1 A possibly even more severe issue is
that media (both mass and social) may be manipulated by the regime. Edmond
(2013) studies the revolution also as a coordination game, but in his paper the
regime can actively manipulate the information. Using global games technique,
he shows that the game has a unique equilibrium. In fact, regimes controlled
tightly the Internet, but the control di¤ered across countries, for example in
Mubaraks Egypt Internet was less censored, than in Tunisia ([4]). As already
mentioned, Facebook, Twitter and even Internet was cut o¤ by the government
in some cases. The autocratic regimesresponse also changed after the successful
revolutions, repression grew in Algeria and Lybia to prevent uprisings there.
Clearly, the mere existence of social media is not enough to bring about a
regime change. In this paper, we show how it can contribute to a successful
revolution through enabling more e¢ cient mobilization.
The descriptions of the recent revolutions reveals why social media are better
to promote mobilization. The basic problem is that individuals fear that not
enough people will go to the protests, so uncertainty about the turnout is the
major obstacle. When mass media report about attendance, then the audience
does not know the reasons for why did not others go. In social media these
reasons can be revealed. For instance, [5] relates in his book that they put
opinion polls online to nd out why people do go to the protest and why not.
The comments in Facebook help also to get insight into the decision-making of
others. These comments also serve to raise spirits. Ghonim describes that he
was surprised to see among the supporters persons that he did not expect to see.
All this together help to "break the barrier of fear" ([5]) and allow individuals
know that they are enough and together they can bring down the dictator.
3. The model
Suppose that there is a nite set of individuals, N = f1; 2; :::; ng and a dictator.
Each individual chooses an action ai 2 fr; sg where r means "revolt" and s "stay
at home". We assume that each individual decides only once, and therefore
1 In Egypt, members of Facebook events took photos of themselves and posted them as a
way to conrm participation. Giving the face can be seen as a way to solve the commitment
problem.
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decisions cannot be changed. Each person i is either of type  i = w (willing
to revolt) or  i = x (unwilling). Willing individuals are ready to participate in
protests, unwilling individuals are reluctant to do so. We suppose that there is
a xed amount  of individuals of the willing type, #fi :  i = wg = ,  2 (0; n)
and, therefore the number of unwilling citizens is also xed, #fi :  i = xg =
n  .2 We assume that n and  are common knowledge.
Individuals decide in a sequence. Let the type vector  = (1; 2; ::; n)
denote the sequence of individuals. The set of sequences of length n with 
willing citizens is given by
n; = f : #f j 2  :  j = wg = g:
There are
 
n


possible type vectors and any of them is selected with equal
probability.
The utility of each individual i depends on her type and the actions chosen
by all individuals. The amount of individuals participating in the revolution
that is necessary to bring the revolt to triumph is given by the threshold t.
Thus, the dictator is overthrown, if and only if at least t citizens decide to
revolt. Otherwise the dictator remains in power. Throughout the paper, it is
assumed that t   is common knowledge, so there are always su¢ cient willing
individuals in the society to change the regime and it is known by everyone.3
However, although the change is achieveable, it needs the coordinated action
of individuals whose decision depends on the expected costs and benets of
participating in the revolution.
Let ai be the action chosen by individual i and let a = (a1; a2; ::; an) be the
prole of actions. We assume that the utility of a willing individual isgiven as
follows:
ui  (w; a : ai = r;#faj : aj = r; j2Ngt) = uw,r,R (1)
ui  (w; a : ai = r;#faj : aj = r; j2Ng < t) = uw,r,F (2)
ui  (w; a : ai = s) = uw,s (3)
with uw,r,R > uw,s > uw,r,F (4)
In words, willing individualsutility is highest when they participate in a
successful revolution (uw;r;R). In the utilities, the rst subscript refers to the
type of the individual, the second to the action that she undertakes, whereas the
third one indicates the outcome. R represents a successful revolution, while F
denotes that it has failed. If they stay at home, they derive less utility (uw;s).4
The lowest utility is derived from taking part in a revolution that is defeated.
2We use "individual" and "citizen" in an interchangeable manner.
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and [8] use threshold models to study problems that involve collective action. [1] uses a
threshold that is commonly known, as we do. In Edmond (2013) there is uncertainty about
the threshold. In [2] each person has an individual threshold.
4The utility of staying at home may depend on whether the revolution triumphs or not. A
successful revolt may bring better life to a willing individual who by staying at home avoids the
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The payo¤ uw;r;F can be interpreted as the punishment that the dictator im-
poses on protesters who participate in a revolution that fails. Su¤ering this
punishment is the potential cost of participation. These utilities generate a
game that resembles the classic stag-hunt situation. However, there are also
unwilling individuals and their presence complicates the analysis.
With respect to unwilling individuals, we assume that they always prefer to
stay at home:
ui(x; a : ai = s) = ux;s
ui(x; a : ai = r) = ux;r
ux;s > ux;r
For simplicity, unwilling individuals are all those individuals who would not
participate in the revolt (whatever reasons they might have). Although their
choice is always the same, their presence makes coordination di¢ cult, since a
willing individual who observes somebody staying at home does not know if it
is due to an unwilling citizen or a willing one who decided not to participate in
the revolt.
Notice that given these payo¤s, the rst best is achieved if the willing people
coordinate and overthrow the dictator. The reason is that unwilling individuals
utility is not a¤ected by the outcome of the revolt, whereas willing individuals
are better o¤ if the uprising is successful.
We suppose that the index of the individual (i 2 N) corresponds to her
position in the sequence of decisions. The information about past decisions
that is available to individuals depends on the communication technology. We
consider three possibilities:
 No technology: Individuals do not have any information on previous choices
when deciding.
 Mass media technology: The individuals have aggregate information about
the actions that have been already taken. We model this fact by intro-
ducing into the information set of each individual the number of actions
carried out by the predecessors. This represents a situation in which in-
dividuals obtain information through radio or television about the state
of the revolution before making their decision and observe the aggregate
turnout in the protests. We disregard manipulation of the mass media.5
 Social media technology: The individuals observe the individual action of
each predecessor. This means that individual i knows exactly which action
costs of the revolution. Thus, there may be free-riding issues at stake as well (see for instance
[11]). Although these are interesting questions (and promising venues of future research), we
disregard them and focus on the coordination problem embedded in the above payo¤s.
5 [4] argues that for example in Egypt a relatively free press could evolve (e.g. journal
Al-Masry al-Yom, TV station Dream) and Al-Jazeera, a media outlet with a high standard
also broadcasts in many Arab countries. Thus, in principle citizens could have a more or less
accurate view of the situation.
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was chosen by each of its i   1 predecessors. When deciding whether
to participate in the revolution, through Facebook or Twitter (or any
other social media) the individual observes the exact history of previous
decisions.
Let 'i denote the information set of individual i. When no communication
technology is available, then 'i = f ig. Thus, in this case individuals only
know their own types, but nothing about other individuals decisions. Mass
media technology implies 'i = f i; i; i  i   1g where i represents the num-
ber of individuals who have decided to revolt up to individual i (i = #faj =
r; j < ig). Thus, we assume that under mass media individuals know both
the amount of predecessors who decided to participate and who chose to stay
at home. It is plausible if citizens may infer somehow how many individuals
have already decided, that is they may gure out their position in the sequence
of decisions. The information set under the social media technology becomes
'i = f i; faj ;8j < igg, so each previous decision is observed, ordered according
to the position.6 As already claimed, on Twitter and Facebook the exact his-
tory of past events can be followed, so eventually really a lot of past decisions
can be observed. Even so, our assumptions are demanding: it is hard to be-
lieve that through TV an individual is able to know exactly how many other
individuals have joined the revolution and on Facebook not all previous actions
are observable, since not everybody uses Facebook or is member of a special
Facebook-group. To derive clean theoretical results, we decided to use these
extreme assumptions. We believe that in spite of our strong assumptions we
capture an essential di¤erence between mass and social media in the form of
how disaggregated the information is.
When no communication technology exists, the lack of information gener-
ates a simultaneous-move game. For the other two cases we specify the extent
to which previous decisions are observable through the communication tech-
nologies. When dening the information sets, we assumed implicitly that if
a communication technology is available to the society, then individuals are
completely informed. As a consequence, individuals may infer perfectly their
position in the sequence of decisions. Mass and social media report about all
previous decisions: mass media aggregate the information whereas social media
present it in a disaggregated form. Our modeling choice allows us to study in
a clear way the di¤erence in the e¤ects that mass and social media have on the
evolution of revolts.7
Our aim is to determine how the di¤erent types of communication techno-
logy (or the absence of it) a¤ect the outcome of revolutions. Moving from no
technology towards social media the amount of available information increases.
6 [11], [12] and [13] addresses questions of information aggregation and political action. In
her models, individuals observe each previous action, but she does not study how di¤erent
communication technologies a¤ect coordination.
7Arguably, it is unlikely that a society is completely informed about the state of the
revolution. A more realistic model would have people receiving partial aggregate information,
some particular information about the decisions of the personal contacts, and no information
about decisions of some others in the society. We leave this issue for future research.
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In principle, the e¤ect of more information is ambiguous: more information may
be good for revolution since it allows a better signaling of own actions to the
subsequent individuals; but at the same time, it could also foster coordination
failure, e.g. if individuals nd out that too many of their predecessors have
chosen not to participate in the revolution. Note that they may observe many
individuals staying at home because those observed citizens were the unwilling
ones.
3.1. Revolutions under di¤erent information structures
Given our environment, revolution is the socially e¢ cient outcome. However,
when information about other individuals is not available, this e¢ cient outcome
may fail to materialize as shown by our rst result.
Proposition 1 If no communication technology is available in the society, there
are multiple equilibria.
This result is a straightforward consequence of the assumptions on the util-
ities, that imply the existence of multiple equilibria in the simultaneous case.
Since uw;r;R > uw;s > uw;r;F , for the willing individuals it is optimal to par-
ticipate if the otherwilling individuals are participating, while it is optimal to
stay at home if nobody else is participating. If a willing individual believes
that the other willing individuals will participate in the revolution, then she
best responds to this belief by participating as well. However, if they hold the
opposite beliefs, then staying at home is the best response. In fact, there are
two symmetric equilibria in pure strategies: i) all willing individuals participate
in the revolution; ii) no willing individual goes to the streets.
The previous result does not depend on whether type is a public information
or not. However, when a communication technology is available this distinction
becomes relevant as shown next.
Type is public information
It is instructive to see how the existence of information a¤ects the outcome of
revolts in a perfect information setup in which the willingness to revolt (that is,
the type of individuals) is transmitted by the communication technology. This
can be the case, for instance, when the people willing to overthrow the dictator
belong to the same social group (e.g. religious association, ethnic groups or
social classes), so that the individual knows the type of the people who have
decided previously. For example, in Egypt the youth in general was unsatis-
ed with the regime, and so were also the Copts. We model this situation by
introducing the type of the predecessors in the information available to each
individual.
In the case of mass media the information set of individual i includes also
the amount of willing individuals up to (but excluding) individual i, denoted as
i. Thus, the information set becomes 'i = f i; i; i i 1; ig. Given this in-
formation set, individual i knows the amount of willing individuals that precede
9
her and how many decided to stay at home. This is a valuable information since
it also reveals how many willing individuals are left to decide. For instance, if
there were many willing individuals who abstained from participating in the
protests, then it is more probable that the total number of protesters will fall
short of the threshold, so staying at home may be a best response. Regarding
social media, the assumption about publicly observed types implies that the
information set of individual i becomes 'i = f i; faj ;8j < ig; f j ;8j < igg.
Hence, both the type and decision of each preceding individual are observed.
Individual is strategy is conditioned on the information set. It is dened as
i : 'i ! fr; sg. Let  2  be a strategy prole, that is,  = (1; :::;n). Let
hi bethe history of the game up to i, formed by a type vector and a sequence
of decision, hi = fa1; :::; ai 1g.
We nd that given a type vector the unique subgame perfect equilibrium with
the two communication technologies is that the revolution succeeds, and every
willing individual chooses to revolt. In this case, both technologies generate the
same equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If type is public information, every willing individual revolts in
any subgame perfect equilibrium under both communication technologies.
Proof See Appendix A. 
The proof of the result makes use of a backward induction argument. A
willing individual chooses to join the revolution if she observes that already
t 1 individuals have revolted. Given this fact, a willing individual who observes
t   2 people participating in the revolution decides to revolt if she knows that
after her there is at least one more willing individual. Since predecessorstypes
are publicly observable, she can infer if there is a willing individual behind
her. Iterating this reasoning, a willing individual decides to revolt when up to
her su¢ cient willing individuals have chosen to do so and she anticipates that
enough willing citizens behind her will follow suit. The conditions ensuring that
this requirement is met at any position imply that all willing citizens choose to
participate in the revolution.
Our assumption on predecessorstype being public information is plausible
in environments where the people willing to overthrow the dictator can be as-
sociated to particular groups. Under these circumstances, it is likely that when
individuals acquire information, they know both the actions and the types of
those who have already decided. In this case, the existence of any of the com-
munication technologies ensures that the revolution triumphs in our simplied
environment. If there is no technology, it is possible to nd equilibria where
the individuals do not coordinate and the dictator remains in power. This res-
ult suggests that given the lack of uncertainty about types social media has
no additional value over mass media, both lead to successful coordination. As
claimed earlier, the uncertainty about how many individuals would participate
in a revolution is the main barrier and it makes most of the individuals who are
discontented to stay at home. This uncertainty comes - at least partly - from
the uncertainty about types that we consider next.
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Type is private information
We study now the case where type is private information, although  is common
knowledge. That is, individuals know that there are su¢ cient people willing to
revolt and overthrow the dictator, but they do not know who they are. Given
the untrust and fear generated by dictators in repressive regimes, this setup may
appear more plausible. As argued by several authors (e.g. [6], [9], [10]), decision
making in any revolution is clouded by a considerable amount of uncertainty.
This uncertainty blurs the information about the public discontent due to several
reasons, e.g. the lack of free press, falsied preference revelation to o¢ cial public
opinion polls or the presence of informants penetrating all layers of the society,
among others.
When type is private information, communication technologies only transmit
to individuals the actions of predecessors. For the mass media technology, the
information set of individual i becomes 'i = f i; i; i i 1g, so the amount of
citizens of each type who have already decided is not known. In the case of social
media, citizen is information set is given by 'i = f i; faj ;8j < igg. Hence,
citizen i cannot distinguish perfectly the type of her predecessors although she
knows the exact sequence of decisions. Remember that observing that somebody
revolts indicates unambigously that she is of the willing type, since unwilling
citizens always stay at home. However, since willing individuals may choose to
stay at home, observing that someone has chosen not to participate in the revolt
does not imply that she is unwilling.
Since type cannot be observed, we look for Perfect Bayesian equilibria. The
following proposition shows that under such circumstances the sort of commu-
nication technology matters. With mass media the revolution succeeds only
when certain conditions are met.
Proposition 3 Consider the case where type is private information. Under
the social media technology, the revolution always succeeds because each willing
individual revolts in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Under the mass media
technology,
 if t <
h
n
n +1
i
+ 1, each willing individual revolts and the revolution suc-
ceeds;
 if t 
h
n
n +1
i
+1, there are equilibria where the revolution is unsuccessful
and nobody revolts for certain values of uw;r;R; uw;s and uw;r;F ,
where [x] is the integer part of x.
The logic behind social media part of the proposition is that if a willing
individual faces a certain set of histories, then she can be sure that all subsequent
willing individuals will revolt. An example is the history that consists of t   1
revolts. Consider histories that are identical to those in the previous set of
histories except for a "revolt" that is missing from the end of them (e.g. a
history made up of t   2 revolts). Given these histories, a willing individual
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would revolt in order to generate a history that ensures that all subsequent
willing citizens revolt and the revolution triumphs. Hence, when observing that
an individual facing such a history does not revolt, then individuals infer that
she is unwilling. Then, a willing individual knows that there are enough willing
individuals left to decide and by revolting she can convince them to revolt as
well.
Under mass media such "identication of types" is not possible. There,
given a number of previous revolts a willing individual will revolt only if she
knows that there are su¢ cient willing citizens behind and enough of them will
revolt. Thus, for instance a willing individual can only be sure that there is at
least one more willing citizen after her if there at least n    + 1 individuals
left. That is, if the number of citizens who have not decided yet is higher than
the number of unwilling citizens. To make sure that more than one (say two)
subsequent willing individuals revolt imposes additional restrictions: the rst
of those willing individuals must be sure that there is at least one more willing
individual behind her. These considerations are embedded in the second part
of proposition 3.
Proposition 3 states that social media technology enables revolution with
certainty, when people know that there are su¢ cient other people willing to
take part in the revolt, even if they do not know who they are. Mass media
bring a revolution to triumph only if the required number of participants to
succeed is su¢ ciently low. Mass media do not ensure that the revolution wins if
a relatively high proportion of the society is required to participate. The main
di¤erence is that social media allow to identify if individuals who have chosen
to stay at home were unwilling or not. Hence, it is possible to infer exactly how
many willing individuals have not decided yet and by backward induction their
choices can be anticipated. These elements ensure that all willing individuals
revolt. By contrast, when only mass media are available, inferring the type
of previous individuals who stayed at home is generally not possible. As a
consequence, it is considerably more di¢ cult to make sure that there are enough
willing individuals left in the sequence of decisions and that those individuals
will revolt. Hence, with mass media the condition for successful revolts becomes
quite demanding.
4. Examples
We illustrate our results of the previous section with unobservable types with
two examples. In the rst one we analyze a simple society of n = 4 individuals
in order to clarify the mechanism why social media promote revolutions more
than mass media. In the second example, we use a society of n = 10 in order to
illustrate the quantitative di¤erence in the e¤ectiveness of social media versus
mass media in fostering revolutions.
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4.1. Example 1
Imagine a society of four individuals, three of them are willing to overthrow
the dictator. The revolution is successful if at least three individuals participate
(n = 4,  = 3, t = 3). As before, payo¤s are such that uw;r;R > uw;s > uw;r;F . In
Figure 1 we illustrate the di¤erences between the communication technologies.
We have drawn a reduced extensive-form representation of the game gener-
ated by each communication technology. We name it reduced form because we
have simplied the representation drawing only one of the four branches that
would follow each of the type vectors. At the beginning of the game, nature
selects at random one of them. In the four possible type vectors willing citizens
are represented by black circles and the unwilling one by a white circle. Since
individuals only observe actions but not types, we have drawn individuals as
grey circles in the rest of the tree. In Appendix C we represent the complete
decision tree for the social media case.
At the top, we represent the case without communication technology in
which the individuals decide without knowing the decisions of their predecessors.
Thus, they only know the position, but nothing else. All nodes at a given
position belong to the same information set. In the middle, we depict the case
of mass media. In this case, an individual only knows the number of citizens that
already joined the protests. For instance, imagine that the fourth individual is
informed that two individuals have chosen to revolt (and, consequently, one
stayed at home). She is not able to distinguish if the sequence was (r; r; s),
(r; s; r) or (s; r; r), hence the information that the citizen in position 4 has
is compatible with three possible sequences of decisions. In contrast to the
previous case, here the nodes at a given position are partitioned in di¤erent
information sets. At the bottom, we draw the social media case. Individuals
are able to identify perfectly the sequence of decisions (the information sets
are singletons), but they do not know the type vector (even though through
observed actions they may infer something about it). We show that in the case
of no communication technology and mass media we may nd equilibria leading
to both successful revolution and to everyone staying at home. By contrast,
with social media the unique equilibrium is the one where all willing individuals
revolt.
Without communication technology, there are two possible equilibria (in
pure strategies): the three willing individuals either choose to revolt or choose
to stay at home. This is the case because for a willing individual to revolt (stay
at home) is the best response when the other willing individuals choose to revolt
(stay at home).
Next, consider the case with communication. From now on, we focus on a
willing individuals decision. Note that in the information sets where 3 = 2 or
4 = 2 (the willing observes 2 previous revolts either in position 3 or 4), the best
response is to revolt. Given this fact, in an information set where 2 = 1 for any
possible belief the best response is also to revolt: the willing individual knows
that she will be followed by at least 1 willing who will revolt. In information sets
where 4 2 f0; 1g or 3 = 0 the revolution is doomed to fail and best response
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is to stay at home.
Figure 1. Reduced extensive-form representation
Thus, when communication is in place, we are left with the information sets
with 1; 2 = 0 and 3 = 1. In words, we do not know yet what a willing citizen
does when she is the rst to decide; when she is in the second position and
observes no protester and when third in the sequence of decision and observes
one protester.
We show now that for given payo¤s, with mass media there are multiplicity
of equilibria including one of unsuccessful revolution, while it is not the case
with social media, where the revolution always succeeds in equilibrium.
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Let us focus on the information sets where 3 = 1. In case of mass media, the
citizen knows that before her an individual joined the protests, while another
one stayed at home. With social media, the citizen would know the concrete
sequence of decision, {r,s} or {s,r}. This di¤erence is crucial for coordination.
We show rst the no-revolution equilibrium for the case of mass media. Consider
the strategy of staying at home in the information sets where 1; 2 = 0 and
3 = 1, and suppose that at the other information sets the individual acts as
established before. We show that then it may be optimal to stay at home when
3 = 1. This is an information set o¤ the equilibrium path. We construct now
some reasonable beliefs about the type of the predecessors. The two possible
histories are {r,s} or {s,r}. The rst of them, {r,s}, implies the deviation of
the rst individual from the proposed strategy prole, and given that a willing
revolts when 2 = 1, the second citizen is an unwilling one. The second history,
{s,r}, implies that the second individual (willing or unwilling) deviated from the
proposed strategy. Thus, a reasonable belief for this o¤-equilibrium information
set would be that previous actions correspond to:
 First citizen willing, second unwilling, who chose {r,s}
 First citizen willing, second unwilling, who chose {s,r}
 Two willing ones, who chose {s,r}.
Note that any of those histories includes only one deviation from the pro-
posed strategies (stay at home if 1 or 2 = 0 but revolt if 2 = 1). Thus a
reasonable belief would assign, for instance, probability of 1/3 to any of them.
If it is the case, then in the information set where 3 = 1, there is a probability
of 1/3 of being preceded by the two willings; in that case, the revolution is
doomed to fail with probability 1/3 and it will triumph with probability 2/3 (if
the willing citizen in 3 = 1 revolts and another willing decides after her). For
a punishment su¢ ciently strong in the case of a failed revolution, the expected
utility of a citizen becomes negative, so the citizen prefers to stay at home.8
This equilibrium of no revolution is not possible under social media. In this
case, when a citizen in the third position observes a revolt, she can distinguish
if the sequence is {r,s} or {s,r}. In the former case the citizen believes with
probability 1 that the individual who stayed at home is the unwilling (a willing
citizen would revolt if she had observed the previous revolt). Therefore, with
probability 1 the last citizen to decide is a willing one, and the best response in
the information set with {r,s} is to revolt. As a consequence, the best response
when being the rst to decide is to revolt, since by previous arguments any his-
tory starting with a revolt ends up in a successful revolution. As a consequence,
in the information set {s}, that is when observing that the rst individual has
stayed at home, willing citizens know that she must have been the unwilling
one. Thus, the type vector is (x;w;w;w) and by backward induction they play
8 It is easy to verify the optimality of staying at home for the cases in which the information
set includes 1 and 2 = 0. It is also easy to verify that to revolt in 1; 2 = 0 and 3 = 1
implies an equilibrium in which the revolution triumphs.
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the unique equilibrium of this subgame in which all of them rebel against the
dictator. Since the willing individual in position 4 (3) revolts when observing
two (one) previous revolts, the willing citizen in position 2 will revolt and thus
the revolution triumphs. Hence, as the game unfolds in any information set that
can be reached (;; (r); (s); (r; s); (s; r) and those with two revolts and one stay-
ing at home), willing individuals revolt and the dictator is overthrown. Notice
that these arguments are valid for any payo¤s such that uw;r;R > uw;s > uw;r;F .
Thus, we have illustrated why equilibrium is unique with social media and
how multiple equilibria may arise under mass media. Proposition 4 generalizes
the main insights of this example. We turn now to show under what conditions
unique outcome with all willing citizens revolting can be achieved with mass
media.
4.2. Example 2
Mass media can also foment revolutions, for any possible payo¤s, but only if
just a relatively low proportion of the society is required to participate in order
to triumph. Imagine a society of 10 individuals, where 7 of them want to over-
throw the dictator that is achieved if at least 5 citizens revolt (n = 10,  = 7). If
all individuals decide simultaneously (the case without communication techno-
logy), both results are possible: the revolution may succeed or fail. This occurs
both when type is public or private information. If type is public information,
following Proposition 2 the unique equilibrium implies that revolution occurs
for sure with either sort of communication technology.
Suppose that type is private information: it is unknown which concrete
people are in favour of the revolution, although every individual knows that
there are 7 people willing to revolt. Because of Proposition 3, under mass
media technology, for given payo¤s, it is possible that nobody takes part in the
revolts, for any t > 3 =
h
n
n +1
i
+ 1. This means that even though more than
two-thirds of the citizens wish to overthrow the dictator, they succeed for sure
only if 3 or less people are required to participate in the revolts.9
The intuition behind this result is the following. If an individual can be sure
that the revolution succeeds, then she joins the protests. Whenever she may
believe that with positive probability the revolution fails, it is possible to nd a
punishment that is su¢ ciently large to deter individuals from participating in
the protests. A willing individual at position [7; 10] cannot be sure that among
the subsequent citizens there is a willing one, since possibly all of them are
unwilling. Hence, if she revolts, in the worst case the number of revolts increases
only by 1. Thus, a willing individual at these positions revolts if she observes
t  1 previous revolts. That is, she revolts if only one more revolting individual
is needed to bring the uprising to triumph. At position 6, a willing individual
knows that there is for sure one more willing individual behind her and she can
9The di¤erence becomes larger if we scale up the numbers. If n = 100;  = 70 and t = 50,
then the revolution succeeds if only 4 or less individuals are required to join the protest in
order to triumph.
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convince her to revolt with certainty if she will observe t   1 revolts. Thus,
the willing citizen at position 6 revolts if she observes t   2 revolts. A willing
individual at position 5 knows that there are at least two willing citizens behind
her, but she cannot make sure that both of them will revolt if she decides to
revolt. This is the case because possibly the rst of the willing individuals is at
position 9 and then by previous arguments this citizen cannot be sure that there
is another willing individual behind her. Hence, a willing citizen at position 5
knows that by revolting she can prompt for sure one more willing individual
to participate, so she revolts if she observes t   2 revolts. The same reasoning
applies to willing individuals at position 4 and 3. A willing individual at position
2 knows that there are at least 5 willing individuals behind her. In the worst
case, the next one is at position 6 and by previous reasoning even she knows that
there is one more willing citizen behind her. So, at position 2 a willing individual
knows that she can induce two more willing citizens. Hence, if she observes that
t   3 individuals have already revolted, then she joins the protest. The same
is true for a willing individual at position 1. Note that a willing individual at
position 1 cannot observe anybody revolting, so the threshold that enables a
succesful revolution is 3 or less citizens. Probably, the unwilling individuals are
at the rst 3 positions. However, rational actors understanding the game infer
that, if with a threshold of 3 none of the rst 2 citizens revolted, then it must be
due to the fact that those individuals were unwilling. But it reveals at the same
time, that there are enough willing individuals behind, so a willing individual at
position 3 (or 4) will revolt. Note that with a threshold of 3 (or less) all willing
individuals will revolt by the previous arguments.
With higher thresholds, the revolution may fail. In particular, suppose that
payo¤s are uw;r;R = 1, uw;s = 0, uw;r;F =  10100 and t = 4. Hence, the dictator
would punish very strongly (say, execute) the participants of a failed revolution.
Consider the following strategy for willing individuals
i('i) =
8>><>>: rif
8<: i = 3;8ii = 2;8i  6
i = 1;8i  2
sotherwise
where i is the amount of participants that have chosen r before individual i.
A willing individual revolts at the information sets specied above. We have
to prove that the strategy is optimal in the rest of information sets. Consider
rst the case of a willing citizen at position 1. Obviously, she observes zero
revolts, so by the proposed strategy prole she should stay at home. What if
she deviates? Conditional on the rst individual being willing, the probability
that the second citizen is willing too is 69 (since all sequences of decision are
equiprobable). Thus, with probability 23 the deviation is successful and if the
subsequent citizens follow the above strategy, then the revolution triumphs.
However, with probability 13 the next citizen is unwilling and she will stay at
home. Then, if the subsequent willing individuals act according to the proposed
strategy, the revolution fails. Given the payo¤s it is easy to calculate that the
expected utility of a willing individual in position 1 is negative, so the deviation
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is not protable. The same argument can be applied for the rest of information
sets to show that no deviation is protable.
In our example, mass media communication guarantees that the revolt suc-
ceeds only if t  3 individuals participation is necessary to overthrow the
dictator. To get an idea how our results a¤ect mobilization, we scale up the
numbers. In a society of 100 individuals in which 51 people are required to
participate in the protests to change the regime, mass media facilitate a suc-
cessful revolution (with all willing individuals revolting) for any payo¤s only if
it is known that all individuals ( = 100) are in favour of the revolution. If the
required threshold were t = 49, mass media would guarantee that the revolution
succeeds only if it was commonly known that at least  = 99 individuals are of
the willing type. Thus, mass media lead to a successful revolution only if there is
a huge amount of people willing to participate in the protests, or if the dictator
is very weak (the threshold is very low). In any other case, the dictator could
implement a su¢ ciently high punishment (uw;r;F ) so that revolts may not occur
in equilibrium. By contrast, social media would guarantee the coordination in
the revolution outcome with much less demanding conditions.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the di¤erential e¤ect of communication techno-
logies on the outcome of revolutions. We distinguish mass and social media by
the degree of information that they provide. In particular, mass media supply
an aggregate piece of information about the actual state of revolution, while
when informed through social media individuals know the precise sequence of
decisions that led to the actual state.
When individualstypes are public information, both communication tech-
nologies enable a successful revolution with certainty, a result that does not
hold without communication technology. Hence, both mass and social media
facilitate the overthrow of the dictator. When types are private information, we
show that the sort of communication technology is relevant: with social media
the revolution succeeds in the unique equilibrium. However, with mass media
the revolution may fail except in cases when the amount of people required to
succeed is su¢ ciently low. If the punishment for participating in a failed revolu-
tion is su¢ ciently high, with mass media the no-revolution equilibrium may be
sustained, but it is not true for the social media technology. In this sense, we
argue that social media facilitate revolts more than mass media do.
As argued earlier, we leave aside important issues (e.g. manipulation of
information) and our model relies on strong simplications (for instance, com-
plete information about previous decisions). It is not easy to see how these
omitted elements a¤ect mass and social media. If the distortions and biases
that these factors cause are not specic to only one of the media technologies,
but the e¤ects are more or less uniform across them, then our model can at least
partly explain some of the di¤erences that communication through social media
is bringing to the society. Our results suggest that social media facilitate the
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e¢ cient decisions under payo¤ structures that possibly generate coordination
failures under mass media.
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2 Appendix A
Proposition 2 If type is public information, every willing individual revolts in
any subgame perfect equilibrium under both communication technologies.
Proof The existence of the equilibrium is guaranteed by standard arguments.
We show that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium each willing individual
revolts.
Let us dene i = #f j = w : j  i j  i = w; g, that is the position of
a willing individual i among the willing individuals in a given type vector ().
Note that i 2 f1; 2; ::g, with  > t and since type is public information i is
in fact observable.
By backward induction, the last willing individual (i = ) revolts if at
least t 1 other willing individuals decided to revolt, because if she follows suit,
then the number of protesters reaches the threshold t, so the revolution will be
successful. Otherwise she decides to stay at home. The next to the last willing
individual (i =  1) revolts if at least t 2 willing predecessors chose to revolt
anticipating that then also the last willing individual will join in. Again, if the
condition is not met, then she stays at home. This argument can be repeated
for all willing individuals: the individual i revolts if at least t   (   i + 1)
other individuals decided to revolt, otherwise she prefers to stay at home. As
a consequence, the rst willing individual (i = 1) revolts even if she does not
observe anybody revolting (t   < 0). Therefore, the revolution succeeds.
Notice that the previous argument to nd the unique subgame perfect equi-
librium works for both types of media, thus Proposition 2 holds. 
3 Appendix B
Proposition 4 Consider the case where type is private information. Under
the social media technology, the revolution always succeeds because each willing
individual revolts in any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Under the mass media
technology,
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 if t <
h
n
n +1
i
+ 1, each willing individual revolts and the revolution suc-
ceeds;
 if t 
h
n
n +1
i
+1, there are equilibria where the revolution is unsuccessful
and nobody revolts for certain values of uw;r;R; uw;s and uw;r;F ,
where [x] is the integer part of x.
Proof Social media
Denote by Htr(k) the set of truthful histories which contain k revolts (and
any  2 [0; n   ] s-s) at any position i  k.10 Truthful histories are those
for which actions reveal the type, so anyone can make sure that only unwilling
citizens stayed at home and the willing ones revolted. Since only willing indi-
viduals revolt, but both willing and unwilling may stay at home, a history is
not truthful if one of the "staying at home" is due to a willing citizen. We can
make sure that a history is truthful if when observing an s we can show that a
willing individual observing a history that precedes the s in question would have
revolted instead of staying at home (that is that staying at home is dominated
for her).
Denition 1 A history hi at position i is truthful, if and only if for any aj = s,
j < i we have that j( j = w; hj 1) = s is a strictly dominated strategy.
That is, if there is an (or more) s in a truthful history, then we have that a
willing individual having observed the history leading up to that s would have
revolted instead of staying at home. Note that when facing a truthful history,
a willing individual knows the exact distribution of possible continuation type
vectors. Important for our analysis, she knows how many willing individuals
are behind. Henceforth, acting truthfully at any information set means, that an
unwilling individual stays at home, whereas a willing one revolts.
Lemma 1 Assume that once an element in Htr(k  k^) is reached all subsequent
willing individuals will revolt, that is, j( j = w; htr(k  k^)) = r. Then, for
the set of truthful histories which contain k^   1 revolts and any  2 [0; n   ]
"stayings at home", we have j( j = w; htr(k^   1)) = r.
Proof The lemma assumes that once a truthful history containing k^ revolts
and at most n   "stayings at home" is reached, for any possible continuation
vector subsequent willing individuals will revolt. Therefore, the only equilibrium
strategy when observing a truthful history with k^ 1 revolts is to revolt if willing.
If a willing individual observes htr(k^   1) 2 Htr(k^   1), then by revolting she
generates a history which belongs to Htr(k^). By our assumption, all subsequent
willing citizens will revolt, so the revolution triumphs. Given such a history the
unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy is to be truthful, since there is no
unilateral protable deviation. 
10Clearly, any history with more than n   "stayings at home" cannot be truthful.
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It is obvious that if a willing individual observes an element in Htr(x) where
x  t  1, then she will revolt and the revolution triumphs. As a consequence,
by lemma (1) if a willing individual observes an element in Htr(t   2), then
she will revolt and again the dictator is ushered from power. Note that any
history beginning with t   1 revolts belongs to Htr(t   1). Any s after t   1
revolts is due to unwilling individuals, since for a willing citizen staying at
home is strictly dominated in this case. Notice also that any history starting
with t   2 revolts is also a truthful history and any willing individual when
observing any history that begins with t  2 revolts would revolt as well. This
is the case for the following reasons. Clearly, t 1( j = w; htr(t  2)) = r, that
is a willing individual at position t   1, who observes t   2 revolts joins the
protest, because then subsequent individuals would observe a history starting
with t   1 revolts and a willing individual at any subsequent position would
revolt. Thus, for this willing individual staying at home is a dominated strategy.
As a consequence, if at 1 = s, that is citizen t  1 stays at home, then it must
be an unwilling individual. Thus, the history that starts with t  2 revolts and
is followed by an s is a truthful history. By lemma (1) a willing individual at
position t facing this history which is an element in Htr(t   2) would revolt,
so t( j = w; htr(t   2)) = r. By the same reason, a willing individual at
position t+1 observing t  2 revolts followed by two s-s would revolt, since she
would cause a truthful history belonging to Htr(t   1) and that would lead to
successful revolution. Applying the same reasoning leads to the conclusion that
when a willing individual observes any history that starts with t  2 revolts and
has at most n    "stayings at home", she will join the revolution. We have
shown in this paragraph that a willing citizen facing any history that belongs
to Htr(t   2) would revolt, since by backward induction all subsequent willing
individuals would participate in the uprising. And we have also shown that all
histories that start with t 2 revolts and have at most n   "stayings at home"
are truthful histories, implying that willing individuals revolt in these cases.
The previous argument can be repeated. By lemma (1) if a willing individual
observes an element in Htr(t  3), then she will revolt producing a history that
belongs to Htr(t   2) and as a consequence all subsequent willing individuals
revolt. It is also true by the previous arguments that any history that starts
with t 3 revolts and has at most n  "stayings at home" is a truthful history,
so willing individuals observing these histories will revolt.
When applying the previous line of reasoning iteratively, we get that any
history starting with 0; 1; 2:::  1 revolts and that have at most n   "stayings
at home" afterwards are truthful histories and willing individuals facing these
histories revolt, because through the previous reasoning we have eliminated
iteratively the dominated strategy of staying at home for those histories. We
summarize these insights in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Assume that once an element in Htr(k  t   1) is reached all
subsequent willing individuals will revolt, that is, j( j = w; htr(k  k^)) = r.
Then, for the set of truthful histories which contain [0; t   1] revolts and any
 2 [0; n  ] "stayings at home", we have j( j = w; htr(k^   1)) = r.
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Note that we have not covered all the possible histories. Concretely, we
have not dealt with histories that contain more than n   "stayings at home".
These are histories that reveal that there is at least one willing individual who
has stayed at home. Given some of these histories revolting may be the optimal
decision. However, we assume the worst scenario: at those histories willing
individuals stay at home. This is the the most hostile assumption that goes
against revolution. However, the set of histories that we analyzed and for that
we know how willing individuals decide is enough to see what may happen in
the game as it unfolds. If the rst individual is willing, then she faces a truthful
history. Hence, her optimal action is to revolt. Thus, the second citizen can be
sure to observe a truthful history, so her optimal action is to act truthfully as
is the case for any subsequent individual. Citizens at any position can be sure
to observe a truthful history to which the unique strategy that is not strictly
dominated is to be truthful. Notice that no such history can be reached that is
not covered by our reasoning above. All these arguments make clear that under
the social media technology the revolution always succeeds because each willing
individual revolts in any perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Mass media 
Proof Given the number of previous revolts, a willing individual revolts if
she can be sure that there are enough willing citizens after her and enough of
them will revolt as well. Any willing individual at a position above  1 cannot
be sure that among the rest of the citizens who have not decided yet there
is a willing individual. Thus, any willing individual who is at position [; n]
will revolt only when observing at least t   1 revolts. A willing individual at
position    1 knows that there is at least one more willing citizen behind her
who will surely revolt if she observes at least t  1 revolts. Therefore, a willing
individual at position   1 will revolt if she observes at least t  2 revolts, since
then she can be sure that the revolution triumphs. The same is true for any
willing individual at position [2   n   2;    1], since willing citizens at these
positions know that there are at least two willing individuals behind them, but
they cannot make sure that the rst of these willing individuals can be sure
that there is another willing individual behind her. If the revolution fails, the
sanction can be execution and that is why a willing individual wants to avoid
the worst scenario.
The previous reasoning can be generalized. In the position interval [; n]
willing individuals can be certain to increase the number of protesters by 1 for
sure: by revolting themselves. When at a position [(  1)  (n  +1);   1] a
willing individual knows that she can increase the number of those who revolt by
2: if she revolts, she can induce a willing individual behind her as well. At any
position [( 1) 2(n +1) 1; ( 1)  (n +1) 1]. Note that the length
of the intervals is n  +1. Since there are n individuals, starting from the last
one we can have
h
n
n +1
i
such intervals. If there is a willing individual is at
positions
h
1; n 
h
n
n +1
ii
, then she can be sure that if she revolts, then she can
induce other willings to revolt and in the end there will be
h
n
n +1
i
+1 revolts.
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If no willing individual is at positions
h
1; n 
h
n
n +1
ii
, then a rational willing
citizen infers that with a threshold of
h
n
n +1
i
+ 1 if no revolts are observed
at positions
h
1; n 
h
n
n +1
ii
, then it is due to the fact that those positions
are taken by unwilling individuals. However, in this case she can make sure
that there enough willing citizens behind, so she joins the revolt. The previous
points show how we obtain the condition on the threshold that determines if a
revolution is successful under mass media. In Example 2 we show that if these
conditions are not met, then the revolution may fail. 
4 Appendix C
Figure 2 represents the complete decision tree for the case of social media.
Individuals are able to distinguish the sequence of actions but they do not know
the type vector. For simplicity, the information nodes that belong to the same
information set for individuals in position 3 and 4 have been marked with the
same geometrical shape.
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Figure 2. Decision tree of the social media case in Example 1
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